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LORD HARDWICKE'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE
LAW OF EXECUTORY TRUSTS
Equity and the Common Law, especially the Law of Real
Property, are the terminal pillars which sustain the arch
of our Anglo-American jurisprudence. One of the most in-
teresting and important phases of English Legal History,
therefore, concerns the attempt on the part of Equity to
make its rules conform, if possible, to the principles of the
Common Law. After the eventual interpretation of the
Statute of Uses I which gave rise to the modem equitable
trust, Equity found itself taking cognizance of a distinctive
type of estate, resulting from the non-operation of that
Statute in the case of certain Uses. The Common Law
had assumed control of those Uses which this Statute exe-
cuted. They became legal estates. They were governed
by the rules of the Common Law, but Equity was confronted
with the task of building up a set of principles for the regu-
lation and control of the equitable estates. In doing this,
Equity endeavored as much as possible to imitate the Rules
of the Common Law. This was the general tendency. But
it seems that variations were essential at times as in the do-
main of the principles which had been early generated in the
English Land Law as the result of the impact of Feudalism.
Because of the peculiarly feudal character of the English
Real Property Law, and because of the genesis of a revolu-
tionary juristic philosophy, which was being followed by
the Chancellors, it appears that in the matter of such prin-
1 The Statute of Uses, 27 Henry VIII, c. 10, was passed in 1535.
The juridicial philosophy of the Statute of Uses, which was called an enact-
ment for the transferring of uses into possession, consisted in this, that the use
was to be executed or converted into a legal estate. There was no longer to
be a distinction between the legal and equitable estates with reference to those
uses to which the Statute applied. As to such uses, the equitable interest in the
cestui que use was changed by the Statute into a legal estate with all the usual
liabilities and responsibilities growing out of such estates.
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ciples as the Rule in Shelley's Case, for example, there could
not be a perfect correspondence between the equitable and
legal attitudes.
Should Equity apply by way of analogy the Rule in Shel-
ley's Case2 to the newly formed trust or equitable estates
in land which were springing up in the middle of the seven-
teenth century? A line of Chancellors from that period un-
til the time of Lord Hardwicke had inclined to the view that
there should be a similarity between the two types of estate
in this respect, subject, however, to a certain exception.
In this matter, Equity followed the Law to avoid confusion
in the realm of English jurisprudence. This exception was
that the Rule in Shelley's Case should not apply to an execu-
tory trust. The exception which the Common Law recog-
nized, i. e., that the Rule in Shelley's Case would not be ap-
plicable where it could be affirmatively proved that the word
"heirs" had not been employed in reference to the descent
forever, was endorsed by Equity. Did Lord Hardwicke I
invariably sustain the view of his predecessors on the wool-
sack, or did he at times overrule some of the precedent which
had grown up on this subject during the century of equi-
table growth preceding his Chancellorship?
Before the era of Lord Hardwicke, the expression execu-
tory trust had a variable meaning. It might mean a trust
which had come within the operation of the Statute of Uses,
2 In Shelley's Case, 1 Coke 94, "the heirs are words of limitation of the
estate and not words of purchase." This case was decided in 1581, but while
the rule derives its name from this case, it had been established in the four-
teenth century. See: Holdsworth, History of English Law (1931) III, 107 and
following. Briefly according to this Rule, when "the ancestor by any gift or
conveyance takes an estate of freehold and in the same gift or conveyance an
estate is limited either mediately or immediately to his heirs" or the heirs of his
body, the ancestor (the beneficiary first designated) will take an estate tail, con-
vertible into a fee simple, through the defeat of the entail.
3 Lord Hardwicke's decisions established the limits of the Equitable System.
His Chancellorship began in 1737 and ended in 1756, approximately. He was
the second of the great triumvirate, Lord Nottingham, Lord Hardwicke, and
Lord Eldon. His contributions in the equitable field are extremely important
since they represent largely the development which took place in Chancery in
the eighteenth century, the great formative epoch.
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or it might describe a situation where the testator or settlor
had not given complete directions for the settling of his
estates with perfect limitations, so that something had to
be done by the trustees to make the trust more complete.
In the first instance, a merely passive trust, for example,
would not be executory for it would be executed by the
Statute of Uses, and it would cease to be a. trust at all. It
was in this sense that the word was used in Broughton v.
Langley (1703).' There trustees were named to permit
a beneficiary to take certain rents and profits during his
lifetime. Another illustrative case was the one of Jones v. Lord
Say and Seal (1728).1 In this latter cause, a reference was
made to Broughton v. Langley, and a distinction was drawn
between the two cases. The explanation was that the Stat-
ute of Uses executed the trust in Broughton v. Langley be-
cause it was merely passive, but it did not execute the trust
in Jones v. Lord Say and Seal because there the trust was
active. It involved the collection and payment of legacies
and a conveyance of the surplus to a beneficiary. But in
both adjudications, the expression trust executed meant a
use executed by the Statute of Uses, and trust executory
designated the opposite idea.
Lord Hardwicke himself at times continued to use the
words executed and executory in the sense just described.
At the beginning of his Chancellorship, in Hopkins v. Hop-
kins (1737),6 he used the terms executed and executory to
designate the effect of the Statute of Uses upon the trust in
question. In that case, he said that all trusts not executed
by the Statute of Uses were executory in a court of Equity.
A similar usage of the expression occurred in Roberts v. Dix-
well (1738) , where the trustees were to make a conveyance,
so that the legal estate remained in the trustees unexecuted
4 2 Ld. Raymn. 873 (1703).
5 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 383 (1728).
6 1 Atk. 581 (1737); Ca. T. T. 44; see 1 Vern. 268.
7 1 Atk. 607 (1738).
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by the Statute of Uses. It was declared in Newcoman v.
Bethlem Hospital ( 1 74 1 )s that in an executory trust it was
necessary for the trustee or trustees actually to perform
something in order to show that the device of the trust was
bona fide and really necessary. The following year, in Bag-
shaw v. Spencer (1742),' he expressed a similar opinion.
To the same effect was Colson v. Colson (1743). l" In 1753,
in Tollett v. Tollett," he asserted that all trusts were execu-
tory to a degree. Further examples were Villiers v. Villiers
(1740),12 Trodd v. Downs (1742),'" Bullock v. Stones
(1754)," 4 and Gibson v. Rogers (1750)." 5 From all these
decisions, the conclusion may be drawn that Lord Hard-
wicke repeatedly employed the expression trust executed to
describe a trust which had been executed by the Statute
of Uses.
But while both before and during the period of Lord Hard-
wicke an executed trust was a trust which had come within
the operation of the Statute of Uses, yet the term executed
might be applied to a trust not executed by the Statute of
Uses to designate a trust in which no further conveyance or
settlement was to be made by the trustees, although they
had active duties to perform, as distinguished from an execu-
tory trust in which the testator or settlor had not given com-
plete directions to the trustees for settling his estates with
perfect limitations. Executed trusts, therefore, were those
which were so fully declared by the person creating them
that nothing further remained to be done to make them com-
plete, as where the terms of the trust were designated by
the terms of the instrument declaring it. That this usage
8 Amb. 9 (1741).
9 1 Ves. Sen. 152 (1742).
10 2 Atk. 247 (1743).
11 Amb. 195 (1753).
12 2 Atk. 72 (1740).
13 2 Atk. 304 (1742).
14 2 yes. Sen. 522 (1754).
15 Amb. 93 (1750).
LORD HARDWICKE'S DECISIONS: TRUSTS
of the words executed and executory, respectively, had ex-
isted before the time of Lord Hardwicke appears from the
case of Glenorchy v. Bosville (1733),16 which was decided
by Lord Talbot.
Lord Hardwicke most generally employed the term trust
executory to describe the non-operation of the Statute of
Uses, but he did employ the expression at times to indicate
the degree of completeness with which a settlor had created
the trust, i. e., in the sense mentioned in the preceding para-
graph. He made the following statement in Roberts v. Dix-
well (1738):17
"... the latter part of the trust was merely executory, to be carried
into execution after the performance ,of previous trusts, so that the
whole direction fell upon the Court of Equity, which was to direct how
the parties were to convey."
Other illustrations may be cited. Thus he said in Hopkins
v. Hopkins (1738)"8 that a distinction had been made be-
tween extraordinary trusts, where the will itself directed a
conveyance, and trusts where there was no conveyance di-
rected but where only the trust was directed by the will. He
said that he would not oust that distinction.
The variable usage of the expressions executed and execu-
tory as applied to trusts must be taken into consideration in
any attempt to determine whether the Rule in Shelley's Case
was applicable to trusts in the formative epoch which is here
being discussed. It was said that generally this Rule did
apply to equitable limitations in both the Hardwicke and
pre-Hardwicke periods. This meant that it applied to trusts
executed (the word executed describing the degree of com-
pleteness of the trust),- for at an early date it was deter-
mined that the Rule in Shelley's Case did not extend to an
executory trust. The holdings in Chancery support the
view that the Rule in Shelley's Case did apply to executed
16 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 743, no. 3 (1733).
17 Op. cit. supra note 7.
18 1 Atk. 580 (1738).
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trusts unless it plainly appeared that the word "heirs" was
not used in its strictly legal signification, so that even at Law
the Rule would not apply to the case in question.
It is certain that in the post-Hardwicke period of the
eighteenth century Chancery was definitely of the opinion
that the Rule in Shelley's Case applied to executed trusts. 9
But the authorities are divided as to whether this principle
was fixed in the pre-Hardwicke and Hardwicke epochs.
Some 20 maintain that it was an early equitable principle,
but others 21 incline to the belief that at least under Lord
Hardwicke, to judge from his decision in Bagshaw v. Spencer
(1743),22 the doctrine was doubtful.
If the expression trust executed is taken in the sense of
a trust which has come within the operation of the Statute
of Uses, of course, the estate referred to would be legal, and
there would be no possibility of the non-application of the
Rule in Shelley's Case, except when it appeared from the
entire instrument that the word "heirs" was not used in its
strictly legal sense to indicate a line of descent forever. This
Rule applied to the trust in Broughton v. Langley (1703),2"
to which reference has already been made, where there was
a merely passive trust. The trustees were to stand seised
to the use of A and the heirs of his body. The result was
that A, the first beneficiary, took an estate tail.
At what- time, approximately, was it determined in Chan-
cery that the Rule in Shelley's Case extended to executed
trusts (the term executed here describing the trust's com-
pleteness) ? Maddock 24 has submitted that this was de-
19 See Wright v. Pearson, Amb. 358, and Jones v. Morgan, I Bro. C. C. 206.
20 See Maddock, Treatise on Equity, (3rd ed. 1837), I, 707, and following;
Fonblanque, Treatise on Equity, (4th Am. ed., 1835), II, 352, and following.
21 See Fearne, Contingent Remainders, (1st Am., from 6th London ed.,
1819), 136, and following; Kales, Application of the Rule in Shelley's Case where
the Limitations are equitable, or where there is an Executory Trust (1913) 8 Il.
L. Rev. 153.
22 2 Atk. 570, 580 (1743).
23 Op. cit. supra note 4.
24 Maddock, op. cit. supra note 20, at p. 694.
LORD HARDWICKE'S DECISIONS: TRUSTS
cided as early as the Chancellorship of Lord Talbot,25 in-
deed, even before that time,26 and that Lord Hardwicke
himself admitted the fact that the word executed might be
employed not only to indicate a trust within the Statute of
Uses, but also to convey a meaning in no way connected
with that Statute. Fearne"2 has written that Lord Hard-
wicke, in Roberts v. Dixwell,2 "expressly distinguished be-
tween legal estates and trusts in general and between sev-
eral sorts of trusts; and therefore in terming one sort of
trust executory, he recognized a distinction between that
and other trusts, that were not so, and clearly pointed out
the nature of that distinction by saying the trust in ques-
tion was merely executory and to be carried into execution,
and referring to the very cases in which the line of distinc-
tion between trusts executory and executed had been explic-
itly and clearly drawn." This authority 2 9 also claims that
Lord Hardwicke had resorted to the distinction "between
two species of trusts, respectively termed executory and
executed, as relative to the latitude of the construction of
the trust, in a manner different from the legal import of the
words of the will." Lord Hardwicke said: 80
"To be sure, where an estate has been granted or given to A for
life and to the heirs of the body of A, such a devise has been by the
Common Law so united in the first person as to convey to him an
estate tail, and the same construction has prevailed with respect to
trust estates."
From what he subsequently said in this opinion,s by "trust
estates" he evidently meant executed trust estates.
But Fearne 32 has argued that Bagshaw v. Spencer
(1743)8 3 was an anomalous case wherein Lord Hardwicke
25 See Atkinson v. Hutchinson, 3 P. Wns. 259 (1734).
26 See Shaw v. Weigh, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 184 (1729).
27 Fearne, op. cit. supra note 21, at pp. 138, 139.
28 Op. cit. supra note 7.
20 Fearne, op. cit. supra note 21, at p. 136.
30 Roberts v. Dixwell, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 608.
31 Op. cit. supra note 30.
32 Fearne, op. cit. supra note 21, at p. 136.
33 2 Atk. 246 (1743).
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adjudged that the Rule in Shelley's Case should not apply
to an executed trust, and by implication that this Rule
should not extend to equitable interests at all, since it had
been settled that the Rule did not apply to executory trusts.
This is also the view of other writers,34 although there are
contrary opinions expressed by legal commentators.3" But
before the effect of the decision in Bagshaw v. Spencer,36
is analyzed, consideration will be given to the principle that
the Rule in Shelley's Case did not apply to executory trusts.
In the instance of trusts executed, the construction of
courts of Law and Equity was the same at an early date,
because the testator was thought not to suppose that any
further conveyance would be made, but in executory trusts,
he was thought to mean to leave something to be done. For
this reason, the court of Equity would not follow the Rule
in Shelley's Case, that is, the strict legal effect of the terms
used by the testator, for the trusts were obviously to be
executed in a more careful and accurate manner. Equity
would direct a settlement which would effectuate the intent
that the "heir" or "heirs of the body" should take by pur-
chase. This was uniformly the rule throughout the whole
eighteenth century. In 1728 Lord King decided in the case
of Papillon v. Voice 11 that the legal principle should prevail
in that limitation in a will which carried the estate in ques-
tion, but this rule did not control the construction of that part
of the will which was wholly executory, although the words
of the will declaring the two trusts were identical otherwise.
In this case, a legacy was directed to be laid out in lands to
be settled. Besides there was a devise of lands simply to
the same uses. The trust was held to be executory in the
first instance, unaffected by the Rule in Shelley's Case,
but executed in the second, governed by this Common Law
34 See Kales, op. cit. supra note 21, at p. 155.
35 See Maddock, op. cit. supra note 20, at p. 708; Fonblanque, op. cit. supra
note 20, at p. 352, and following.
36 Op. cit. supra note 22.
37 2 P. Wns. 478 (1728).
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Rule. This had been the equitable viewpoint even earlier,
for it obtained in Leonard v. Sussex,38 which was decided in
1705. The facts were that a mother devised lands to
trustees to pay debts and legacies and then to settle the re-
mainder on her son and the "heirs of his body," with re-
mainders over. The court said that the trust was executory,
to be construed as if a similar provision had been included
in marriage-articles. A "strict settlement" was, therefore,
decreed, i. e., the son was held to be only a tenant for life.
Since the trust was executory, the Rule in Shelley's Case
did not apply. A third illustration is the case of Glenorchy
v. Bosville (1733).11
This early eighteenth century precedent to the effect that
the Rule in Shelley's Case should not apply in the instance
of an executory trust was endorsed by Lord Hardwicke.
Thus at the beginning of his Chancellorship, he held in
Roberts v. Dixwell (1738)40 that if a testator by will di-
rected his trustees to convey to his daughter for life and to
the "heirs of her body," the trust would be executory and the
daughter would take only n estate for life in the lands de-
vised. In this adjudication 4 Lord Hardwicke said:
"Where the trusts are merely executory, and something remains to
be done to perfect and carry into effect the testator's intention, the
court is not confined to the strict rules of the Common Law but gov-
erns itself by the testator's intention and does that which will best
answer and support it."
The first exception to the general rule that the Rule in
Shelley's Case should by analogy apply to equitable estates
arose from the fact that in executory trusts Chancery thought
that it should effectuate the true intent of the settlor when
he did not act as his own conveyancer. It was thought that
in an executory trust when the words "to A for life, remain-
der to the heirs of his body" occurred, the testator or settlor
38 2 Vern. 526 (1705).
39 Ca. T. T. 3 (1733).
40 Op. cit. supra note 7.
41 Roberts v. Dixwell, op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 608.
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actually intended a succession of beneficial interest; hence
the heirs took as purchasers. Lord Talbot had declared in
the case of Glenorchy v. Bosville (1733)42 that in trusts
executory the testator's intent was to prevail. Other cases
of similar import were Papillon v. Voice (1728)" 3 and
Leonard v. Sussex (1705)."4 Lord Hardwicke was of the
same opinion. He expressed the conviction in Newcoman
v. Bethlern Hospital (1741)" 5 that there had been created
in that case an executory trust so that the intent of the
testator should be followed. This principle was repeated
in Marryat v. Townley, "' which he decided in 1748. Other
cases which showed that Lord Hardwicke was of this opin-
ion were Roberts v. Dixwell,47 and Garth v. Baldwin
(1755).48 To quote from his opinion in Read v. Snell:49
". .. where it is a trust executory, this court is bound to see a
settlement is made agreeable to the intention of the testator . .."
The second exception to the general rule that the Rule
in Shelley's Case should apply to equitable estates was that
the heirs would take as purchasers where it could be affirm-
atively demonstrated that the word "heirs" was not used
technically to designate the line of descent forever. In this
respect, Equity followed the Common Law, for such a dem-
onstration would defeat the application of the Rule in
Shelley's Case even at law. As an example of this may
be cited the case of Allgood v. Withers (1735).5o The first
beneficiary took an estate for life and the heirs took by pur-
chase. Lord Talbot came to this conclusion because "the
limitation to the heirs of the body of the first beneficiary
was blended with that to the heirs of the bodies of several
42 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 744 (1733).
43 2 P. Wins. 478 (1728).
44 2 Vern. 526 (1705).
45 Op. cit. supra note 8.
46 1 Ves. Sen. 103 (1748).
47 Op. cit. supra note 7.
48 2 Ves. Sen. 646 (1755).
49 2 Atk. 642, 648 (1743).
50 Cited, 1 Ves. Sen. 150 (1735).
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others, who could not take otherwise than by purchase;
and there were words of limitation not only to the heirs,
but to the assigns of all the said heirs of the bodies alike." "
Was this the position which Lord Hardwicke took in the
much controverted case of Bagshaw v. Spencer? 52
The holding in Bagshaw v. Spencer,53 has been variously
interpreted. The facts were that a testator devised lands
"to the use of T, his nephew for life, without impeachment
of waste, and after the determination of that estate, to the
trustees and their heirs during the life of T to support con-
tingent remainders, and after his decease to the use of the
heirs of the body of T." The trust was executed (in ref-
erence to the completeness of the trust). But Lord Hard-
wicke ruled that the heirs should take as purchasers, i. e.,
that the Rule in Shelley's Case should not apply to this situa-
tion. The trustees were to perform active duties, so that
the limitations were equitable. There is a sharp division
of opinion as to the correctness of this ruling and as to the
reason for it. Especial objection is made to that part of
Lord Hardwicke's opinion 54 wherein he said:
"All trusts are in the notion of law executory and are to be exe-
uted in this court. At law before the Statute of Uses, every Use was
a trust. Then the Statute executed the legal estate and united it to
the Use, and hence a trust executed is a legal estate."
As Maddock 55 and Fonblanque " have correctly pointed
out, Lord Hardwicke was by this statement simply calling
attention to the fact that the term executed might indicate
the effect of the Statute of Uses upon certain types of trusts;
he was not denying the distinction between arrangements
wherein the settlor had precisely defined the settlement
which was to be made by the trustees, although the trustees
51 Fearne, op. cit. supra note 21, at pp. 120, 121.
52 Op. cit. supra note 22, at p. 580.
53 Op. cit. supra note 22.
54 Bagshaw v. Spencer, op. cit. supra note 22, at p. 583.
55 Maddock, op. cit. supra note 20, at p. 708, and following.
56 Fonblanque, op. cit. supra note 20, at p. 352, and following.
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had active duties to perform, and situations wherein the
settlor had not acted as his own conveyancer. They have
reasoned that Lord Hardwicke in Bagshaw v. Spencer"
was of the opinion that the expression trust executed, when
properly employed, described a trust which had been
changed into a legal estate by the Statute of Uses. But
their implication that Lord Hardwicke in that case was
arguing against the propriety of using the expressions ex-
ecuted and executory, respectively, without reference to the
effect of the Statute of Uses is unwarranted, for he em-
ployed the word executed in that same opinion to indicate
the jurisdiction which Equity exercised over equitable es-
tates; he declared that "all trusts .... are to be executed in
this court." 58 But they are correct in maintaining that
Lord Hardwicke in Bagshaw v. Spencer : was not wiping
out the distinction between trusts executed and executory
in the sense of trusts which were fully declared and those
in which the settlor did not settle his estate with perfect
limitations. Indeed it has been shown that Lord Hard-
wicke actually recognized this distinction in numerous de-
cisions which he handed down. Authorities like Fearne "
and Kales 61 are not justified by the facts in concluding that
Bagshaw v. Spencer" is an anomalous case, subsequently
over-ruled, and that it stands for the proposition that the
Rule in Shelley's Case is not to apply when the interests
are equitable. At the same time, it appears that Maddock
and Fonblanque have not demonstrated the inaccuracy of
these two conclusions simply by stating that Lord Hard-
wicke was challenging the propriety of employing the
words executory trust without reference to the Statute of
57 Op. cit. supra note 22, at p. 580.
58 Op. cit. supra note 22, at p. 583.
59 Op. cit. supra note 22, at p. 580.
60 Fearne, op. cit. supra note 21, at p. 136.
61 Kales, op. cit. supra note 21, at pp. 153, 154, 155.
62 Op. cit. supra note 22, at p. 580.
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Uses, because actually the trust in Bagshaw v. Spencer 6
was executed (i. e., the settlor had acted as his own con-
veyancer), and yet Lord Hardwicke refused to be guided
by the Rule in Shelley's Case. But if this is so, why are
not Fearne and Kales justified in making the inferences to
which reference has been made?
First objection to Bagshaw v. Spencer: that Lord Hard-
wicke there held that the Rule in Shelley's Case did not
apply when the limitations were equitable. But Lord Hard-
wicke in numerous decisions acted upon the distinction be-
tween trusts created by a settlor who acted as his own con-
veyancer (trust executed) and those where this was not the
situation (trust executory). From these decisions, it ap-
pears that Lord Hardwicke believed that the Rule in Shel-
ley's Case should not apply when the trust was executory,
but that it should when the trust was executed, unless the
word "heirs" was not employed in its strictly legal sense to
designate the line of descent forever. This view had pre-
vailed before his time both in Law and Equity. Lord Hard-
wicke did not apply the Rule in Shelley's Case in Bagskaw
v. Spencer,6 4 even though the trust was executed, because
he thought that this case came within the exception men-
tioned above. Only in rare situations, according to the
viewpoint of eighteenth century Equity, should this ex-
ception be allowed to prevail in executed trusts to prevent
the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case. But the ex-
ception had been admitted. Evidently Lord Hardwicke's
ratio decidendi in Bagshaw v. Spencer65 could not be criti-
cized on the ground that he overthrew precedent; the wis-
dom of the decree itself could be attacked only on the ground
that the facts in the case were not sufficient to justify Lord
Hardwicke in concluding that the word "heirs" had been
used as a word of purchase to designate the immediate heirs
63 Op. cit. supra note 22, at p. 580.
64 Op. cit. supra note 22, at p. 580.
65 Op. cit. supra note 22, at p. 580.
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of the first beneficiary at his death. These facts were, first,
the insertion of trustees by the testator to preserve contin-
gent remainders after the determination of the equitable life
estate, and secondly, the giving of an equitable life estate
to the ancestor without impeachment of waste. The suf-
ficiency of these two elements to justify Lord Hardwicke in
reaching the conclusion which is found in Bagshaw v. Spen-
cer is truly an issuable matter.
Second objection: that Bagshaw v. Spencer was an anom-
alous case, subsequently over-ruled."6 But obviously it
was not anomalous for it was in agreement with what Lord
Hardwicke had said in other adjudications, and in accord
with pre-Hardwicke precedent on the subject. It is true,
however, that Lord Hardwicke in certain parts of his opin-
ion in Bagshaw v. Spencer 6 7 has so over-emphasized the im-
portance of intent in the construction of equitable interests
as to obscure the real basis of his decision, namely, the
right of both Law and Equity to ignore the Rule in Shelley's
Case when the word "heirs" has not been used in its strictly
technical or legal meaning. The two cases usually cited to
show that Bagshaw v. Spencer was subsequently over-ruled
in the eighteenth century are Wright v. Pearson (1758)68
and Jones v. Morgan (1778).69 But Lord Keeper Henley
in deciding the case of Wright v. Pearson actually reconciled
his holding with the principle upon which Lord Hardwicke
acted in Bagshaw v. Spencer. He declared that Lord Hard-
wicke had assumed no more power than every court of Law
had. He said in effect that Lord Hardwicke was correct
in deciding the case of Bagsha w v. Spencer, as he did, even
though the trust was executed, because of the manner in
which the word "heirs" was employed, and that he himself
66 See Fearne, op. cit. supra note 21, at pp. 130, 131, 134, 135; Kales, op. cit.
supra note 21, p. 154.
67 Op. cit. supra note 22, at p. 581.
68 Amb. 358 (1758).
69 1 Bro. C. C. 206 (1778).
LORD HARDWICKE'S DECISIONS: TRUSTS
proceeded on the same principle in Wright v. Pearson."
The legal principle expressed in Bagshaw v. Spencer was not
over-ruled in Jones v. Morgan although Lord Thurlow may
have been correct when he expressed dissatisfaction with
the decree in Bagshaw v. Spencer, for it is doubtful whether
the elements of the will in this latter case were strong
enough to defeat the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case
in an executed trust, which in this connection was on the
same plane as a legal estate, but this was a matter of in-
terpretation, not of principle. Lord Hardwicke in Bag-
shaw v. Spencer acted upon established principles, so that
the case could not be anomalous. Lord Thurlow himself in
Jones v. Morgan admitted that Lord Hardwicke had ex-
plained his holding in Bagshaw v. Spencer in the subsequent
case of Garth v. Baldwin (175 5),71 where it was stated that
the construction of trusts executed must be according to the
construction of legal estates, unless there was such evidence
of the non-technical use of the word "heirs," as for example,
when it meant "children," as would over-rule the legal con-
struction.
Today the Rule in Shelley's Case is still the law in Eng-
land and Canada,72 but it has been abrogated a. to wills
or deeds or both in a majority of the American States .
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The need for understanding when a principle analogous to
the Rule in Shelley's Case, therefore, should be applied to
trusts is diminishing but has not disappeared. If Lord Hard-
wicke in Bagshaw v. Spencer actually held that the Rule
in Shelley's Case should not apply where the limitations
or interests were equitable, he was anticipating almost two
hundred years ago the majority action which has been taken
in the United States. If he did not go that far in Bagshaw
v. Spencer, and it is submitted that he did not, still it is
70 Op. cit. supra note 68.
71 1 Bro. C. C. 222 (1755).
72 See 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1159 to 1170.
73 Op. cit. supra note 72; see 13 A. L. R. 383 to 398.
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evident that he did not believe that the Rule in Shelley's Case
should prevail as to equitable limitations in every possible in-
stance. Though the action of Lord Hardwicke in this case
may be impugned in so far as he may have misinterpreted the
effect of certain testamentary clauses and wrongly concluded
from them that even if the limitations had been legal instead
of equitable the Rule in Shelley's Case would be non-opera-
tive in Bagshaw v. Spencer, so that he evoked the wrath of
Judges and legal Commentators, in both England and the
United States, nevertheless in so far as he tended not to rely
on the fetish of the Rule in Shelley's Case, he was in accord
with the prevailing American attitude.74
Dr. Brendan F. Brown.
The Catholic University of America.
74 See Powell, Future Interests (1928), at p. 202, note.
Kales, op. cit. supra note 21, has concisely summarized the rules for the
determination of executory trusts.
